

Botnet Tracking: Tools, Techniques, and Lessons Learned

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Security to the Core. Performance to the Edge.™

About Arbor Networks

- Founded in 2000
- ~150 employees worldwide
- Peakflow product lines
 - Peakflow SP for service providers
 - Peakflow X for enterprises
- Anomaly detection products
 - Primarily NetFlow-based data collection
- The global DDoS response leader





Botnets



- Pressing problem for network operators
- ISPs number 1 pressing issue
- Enterprises
 - Unknown threat scale
 - Big concern to many

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Bots in the Malware Taxonomy

- Bots exhibit worm characteristics
 - Use network exploits to propagate
- Bots exhibit backdoor characteristics
 - Start up a network listener service, inbound connections
 - FTP server, web server, etc
 - Connect outbound to receive connections
- Bots utilize rootkits
 - Rootkits hide their presence
- Bots have spyware components
 - Keystroke loggers for information theft
- Bots are extensible and may download additional software
- A botnet herder may load adware and/or spyware on a compromised system



- Bots are distributed computing and resources
- Help build a buffer between criminals and victims
- Botnets have aggregate storage and bandwidth
- Excellent for illicit activities
 - Spam (increasingly pump and dump)
 - DDoS
 - Warez, stolen media



Know Your Goals



Malware Collection

– Popular with AV, security companies

- Attack Traceback
 - Our primary goal

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Attacker Profiling and Assessment

– Small, specialized field





Botnet Tracking Requirements

• Origins

- Can't do this from your desktop!

Targets

– Botnet server, passwords, bot characteristics, etc

Malware

- Have to know what a bot would do

Client

- Have to have a botnet client to participate





Secondary Requirements

Distant origins

- Don't want it to tie back to you

Multiple origins

- Don't want to be too obvious

Familiarity with attacker underground

- Exploits, vulnerabilities, underground economy

Language skills

- Be able to read and write foreign languages











How to Actively Monitor Botnets

Sacrificial Lambs

- One binary at a time
 - Repeat for every new bot
- High risk of participating in an attack
- Lower risk of looking "out of place"

Custom Clients

- Multiple nets at once
- Easy to customize
- May look "different" (and hence suspicious)

This is what we'll use





Botnet Tracking Client Requirements

- Secure
- Scalable
- Flexible
- Easy to retarget
- Records everything it sees
- Stealthy



Project Bladerunner

Botnet infiltration

- Active monitoring
- Multiple networks at once
- Uses Python and irclib module

Also wrote a Kaiten tracking tool

- Kaiten affects Linux systems
- Focused only on IRC-based botnets





- Mimics a basic bot
- Understands "login", "join"
- Chooses to be quiet rather than misspeak
- Logs everything





- Time consuming to defang a bot
- Only needed very basic functionality
- Knew code very well
- Little risks (DDoS, installations, etc)
- Bladerunner was about 300 LoC

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- Need to know host, nickname format, and passwords
 - Blacklists, AV writeups insufficient

Captured malware

- In house analysis

Norman Sandbox digest

– Back when it was free

Link sharing

- Strong research community



Botnets and DDoS



- About half of all botnets we tracked performed DDoS attacks
 - Most attacks are not against a significant target
 - Most attacks are not crippling to the endpoint
- Did observe a set of high profile attacks in the spring of 2006
 - Against a series of anti-spam and anti-DDoS companies
- DDoS nets use different bots than spyware or adware bots
 - Not all bots have DDoS capabilities
 - Type of bot used can often indicate intent of herder







Looked at DosTracker archive

- Arbor project to analyze global DDoS provalence
- Over 20,000 DDoS attacks measured between Sept 2006 and January 2007
- Looked at Shadowserver botnet tracking logs of DDoS attacks
 - Over 21,000 attacks in this timeframe
 - Over 400 unique IRC servers

Attack intersection results

- 2% of all DDoS attacks measured by Arbor had clear botnet cause
- 13% of all DDoS attacks recorded by botnet tracking showed up in Arbor monitors



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Our Current Position in Botnet Response

(Community position)

Collection

- Nepenthes or other honeypots

Communication

- Whitestar list, DA, NSP-SEC, Shadowserver, etc

• Analysis

- Sandboxing (Norman dominates)

• Tracking

- Shadowserver, some private tracking





• Source code is widely available

- GPL licensed, using CVS!
- GUI-based configuration, no coding skills needed
- Bug fixing
 - Compare SpyBot in 2004 and 2006
 - Lots of little bugs fixed: string bounds checks, etc

Multiple types of bots

- SpyBot, SDBot, Reptile, Agobot, Rbot, RxBot, Kaiten, etc ...
- Lots of overlapping capabilities, not all support DDoS
- Which codebase you use depends on your intentions

Proliferation of spyware, adware provides money





Where the Botherders Aren't

• IRC

- Too many snoops on IRC
- Too easy to break into
- Lots its "elite" factor some time ago
- Growing number of HTTP, IM, and other bots

• Web Forums (eg Ryan 1918)

- They know these are monitored



We've Peaked!



- This combination reached its peak in early 2006
- Good guys
 - Lots of basic RE analysts
 - Armed with tools like sandboxes
 - Lots of collection networks (ie Nepenthes)
 - Rapidly caught, analyzed, and tracked botnets

Bad guys

- Explosion in bots and botnets launched
- Only a few botnet groups were actively thwarting attacks
- HTTP and P2P bots were not very popular yet (still IRC heavy)
- Lots of botnets were very visible

This confluence meant we peaked



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The Revolt by Botnet Operators

- More and more bots are defeating the basic techniques
- Sandboxes are being defeated
 - Increased use of debugger checks
 - Delays in revealing useful information
 - Poisoning data
 - Inject fake bots to detect people who mine Norman for data

Honeypots and honeynets

- Detected or ignored


IRC tools

- Fingerprinted and blocked, or simply ignored
- It's all downhill from here!



The Botnet Herder Ability Curve







Non-Technical Challenges

• Acting on the data

- Takedown, blackhole, etc
- Becoming facilitated with commercial solutions

Speed - getting usable data quickly

- Trustworthiness of the data is key

Reaction

- This is a reactive cycle
- Need proactive mechanisms





- Getting the information in the right hands
 - Thousands of botnets a week, only so much operators can do
 - Cannot blindly block
- Focus is on active, high profile DDoS networks
- Coordination is a pain in the neck
 - DNS registrar

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- DNS server network(s)
- C&C host network(s)
- Botnet operators can easily stay a few steps ahead
- Complement is egress filtering for victims



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Technical Challenges



- Encrypted communications channels
- Defeating rapid analysis techniques
- New or custom command languages – HTTP, peer to peer



Encrypted Channels



Encryption

 Windows "Somelender" bots - homegrown Caesar cipher

(66.186.35.22:8080) :ckodg!j@tyrant PRIVMSG ## :=GoU6jyt7xCuvfRamp+NOAeNFFF/q/h9EHT/H6DV5fxcD7RoX9Pt5a/o2AST9N+j4Y4jf (66.186.35.22:8080) :ckodg!j@tyrant PRIVMSG ## :=rvyJWDmfvujXJ4XDKp5 (66.186.35.22:8080) :ckodg!j@tyrant PRIVMSG ## :=+rhlS+/trmwFfUNtERLa

Decrypts to:

(66.186.35.22:8080) :ckodg!j@tyrant PRIVMSG ## :40% ddos tcp 65.77.140.140 6667 900 -s -f -i -2 (66.186.35.22:8080) :ckodg!j@tyrant PRIVMSG ## :* kill dos (66.186.35.22:8080) :ckodg!j@tyrant PRIVMSG ## :* kill ddos





Fallout from Encrypted Commands

- Very time consuming
- Two options
 - Mimic bot

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- Must reverse encryption algorithm
- Must implement
- Honeypot the bot and monitor it
 - Doesn't scale well
- This dramatically slows down botnet tracking



Defeating AV Detection



• Polymorphism is rare

- Achieve polymorphism by simply repackaging bots
- New or modified packer
- Fresh compile
- Bingo, AV fails to detect

 The bot is just a tool to load the real payload on the box

- Spyware, adware, spam tools, etc ...
- The bot code itself can be thrown away once it's gotten the second stage payload on board





- Increased use of obfuscated, anti-reversing binaries
 - Anti VMWare, debugger, sandbox mechanisms available as drop in modules
 - Increasingly popular in 2006
 - Abuse well-known holes in these tools, bot stops working in their presence
 - Thwarts automated analysis, requires a trained human





- Increased use of rapid analysis thwarting tools
 - eg Debugger detection
 - Poisoned "wells" (honeypots)
- Detection and disabling of sandbox tools
 - Detect VMWare
 - Detect Norman


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- Result: no results
- Solution: put a human in the loop





Defeating Sandboxes and Honeypots





Defeating Sandboxes



```
Norman Scanner Engine 5.83. 10
Sandbox 05.83, dated 1/01-2006
Your message ID (for later reference): 20060217-1786
7a9aee7b604acdbffa8c891b40845ec5 : Not detected by sandbox (Signatu
[ General information ]
 * **IMPORTANT: PLEASE SEND THE SCANNED FILE TO: <u>ANALYSIS@NORMAN</u>
ENCRYPT IT (E.G. ZIP WITH PASSWORD)**.
 * Anti debug/emulation code present.
 * File length: 214528 bytes.
(C) 2004-2006 Norman ASA. All Rights Reserved.
The material presented is distributed by Norman ASA as an informat:
```





HTTP Bots



Two main mechanisms

- Phone home (register, poll for commands)
- Register, await an inbound connection
- Communication is over HTTP, using URLs
- Korgo, Padobot, Bzub, Nuclear Grabber
- Example registration URL
 - http://XXXXXXX/index.php?
 - id=jqkooamqechepsegsa
 - &scn=0
 - &inf=0

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- &ver=19
- &cnt=GBR





- Harder to spot
 - No long lived connection
- Have to know what to look for in URL logs
 - Hiding in the maelstrom
- Still uses a central command point
 - Easy to block

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- Not too hard to lurk
 - Poll server, understand replies





Storm Worm (CME-711, January 2007)

- UDP-based eDonkey protocol
- Used to send spam

Nugache (Spring, 2006)

- Encrypted TCP, custom command protocol
- No clear use for this network yet
- Network is still alive

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Effectiveness: 100,000+ nodes, sustained network





Resilient network

- No central point to shut down
- No central point to block

Difficult traceback

- Network manager can enter network from anywhere
- Anyone can join network
- Reverse protocol, join and lurk



Changes in Botnet Handlers' Intents



Previously

- Getting the bot on there was the end goal
- Keeping the bot on there was important

• Now

- The bot is just to bootstrap new code on there
- The bigger that window of opportunity is, the better
- Evade AV detection by staying ahead
- First seen on a wide scale with Zotob



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- Increased spam volumes
- All attributable to deployed botnets
- High impact DDoS events against high profile crimefighters, antispam groups
- Inter-spam gang fighting
- With success like this, don't expect a slowdown



The Botnet Arms Race



Bad Guys

- More bot families Then
 - More bots
 - Packers and obfuscators
 - More botherders
 - Leaving IRC behind
- Now Encryption

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ecca eaje	
 Behavioral analysis 	Sca
 Sandboxes 	Scalable
 Process dump tools 	
 More analysts 	
 Sacrificial lambs 	V
	Not
 Reversing 	

Good Guve



Conclusions

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- Botnets have been a sustained growth industry
- Botnet herders have increasingly ditched their "minders" (the good guys)
- Botnets are increasingly used for high profile problems and crime
- We must work hard to adapt to these new realities and increase our monitoring
 - Collaboration will be crucial

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Reactive

Proactive

How do we get from here

To here? We must.

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